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THE ROLE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN IN OHIO:
MOVING AWAY FROM THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Ohio, the comprehensive plan is the document upon which all
zoning regulations depend. Current Ohio zoning law, however, has relegated the plan to a mere advisory position. Following the lead of other
jurisdictions, Ohio has rendered the comprehensive plan an impotent
document by adopting a position which presumes that the comprehensive plan is encompassed within the zoning ordinance itself.
A minority of jurisdictions have, however, re-established the preeminence of the comprehensive plan by mandating its development and
requiring that all zoning ordinances, amendments or variances be consistent with it. Even though Ohio remains committed to the majority/
unitarian view, this article recommends that Ohio must legislatively or
judicially adopt the minority view and restore to the comprehensive
plan the predominance and power it demands within the law of zoning.
This comment examines the role of the comprehensive plan in the
history and development of zoning in the United States. Two views regarding the plan predominate in the United States today. The majority
view is patterned after the New Jersey Supreme Court decision of
Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery.1 This view considers the com-

prehensive plan to be incorporated within the comprehensive zoning ordinance of the local governmental unit thereby denying the comprehensive plan a separate, independent identity. The minority view places the
comprehensive plan outside the comprehensive zoning ordinance and
establishes the comprehensive plan as a separate, independent document to which all zoning regulations must conform. This view is gaining acceptance in the United States. Most jurisdictions espousing this
minority view have legislated the creation of a separate comprehensive
plan. Oregon is the only state that has required the creation of a separate comprehensive plan through judicial action.'
In Ohio, as in the majority of states, the failure to require a comprehensive plan, which would serve as the prototype to which all zoning
regulation must conform, leads to arbitrary and discriminatory practices due to the lack of limitations placed upon zoning boards. These
and other weaknesses in the majority view suggest the need for change
in Ohio. Ohio should adopt the minority view in order to strengthen the
1. 131 A.2d I (N.J. 1957).
2. See infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
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comprehensive plan and elevate it to its proper place in zoning law.
This comment concludes with an examination of the court's rationale in
Columbia Oldsmobile, Inc. v. City of Montgomery,' the most recent
Ohio Supreme Court decision to consider the status of the comprehensive plan in Ohio.
II.

BACKGROUND

Before the advent of modern zoning, land usage was restricted primarily under the doctrines of nuisance and of restrictive covenants.4
Most land uses, however, are not nuisances, and restrictive covenants
are applicable only to particular tracts of land. Therefore, communities
needed comprehensive zoning to bring about orderly development. 5
New York City passed the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in
the United States in 1916.6 For ten years following the passage of the
New York City ordinance, state courts were frequently confronted with
the question of the constitutionality of municipal zoning ordinances.7
The future of comprehensive zoning lay in the balance. Then, in 1926
the United States Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.8 The decision recognized
municipal planning and the regulation of land use as valid exercises of
the state's police power.9
Because zoning is of local interest, the states have chosen, pursuant to Euclid, to defer the power to zone to local legislatures. Most
states have authorized local zoning activity through the passage of enabling statutes 10 which are based largely upon two acts drafted by the
United States Department of Commerce. First, the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act" authorizes municipalities to engage in city
planning. An advisory committee to the Department of Commerce
3. 564 N.E.2d 455 (Ohio 1990), reh'g denied, 566 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio 1991); see infra notes
120-36 and accompanying text.
4.

Cf I EDWARD

ZIEGLER JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING

§

1.01[1], at 1-2 (1975).
5. Id. at 1-3.
6. 5 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 37.01[2] (1978). See generally Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E. 209, 210 (N.Y. 1920) (holding that the

New York City resolution which divided real estate into three districts furthered the "public
health, welfare, convenience, and common good" of New York City).
7. 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 99 (3d ed. 1986).
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154
(1955). After Euclid, municipal zoning was authorized in all states, even those that previously
had held zoning unconstitutional. I ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 104. Furthermore, it is from this

case that comprehensive zoning, which sometimes has been referred to as "Euclidian" zoning, gets
its name.
10.

Haar, supra note 9, at 1155.

11.
ADVISORY COMM. ON CITY PLANNING AND
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/8
STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928)
BLING ACT].

ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE.

A

[hereinafter STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENA-
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drafted the act in 1928.12 This act provides for the establishment of a
planning commission which would formulate a "master plan" to control
"'the height, area, bulk, location, and use of buildings and premises.' "13 Furthermore, this power to zone is derived "directly from state
zoning enabling acts.""'
The second act upon which the majority of the enabling statutes
have been based is the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act.' 5 This act
was also drafted by the Department of Commerce. One of its requirements is that the zoning ordinance and all its amendments be drawn
"in accordance with a comprehensive plan."' 6
It is important to note that the terms "zoning" and "planning" are
not synonymous. Zoning is the "division of a municipality or other local
community into districts, and the regulation of buildings and structures
according to their construction and the nature and extent of their use,
or the regulation of land according to its nature and uses.' 7 The following have been proposed as purposes of zoning:
to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and
other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue
concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public
8
requirements.1

12.
13.
14.

Haar, supra note 9, at 1155.
Id. (quoting STANDARD CITY
Id.

PLANNING ENABLING ACT,

supra note 11, § 6).

15.

ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE STANDARD STATE ZON(rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in 5 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF,
RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING app. A (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter STANDARD
ING ENABLING ACT

The U.S. Department of Commerce's first attempt at this act
was in 1922. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 71.
16. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 15, § 3. Section three of the Act
reads in full:
PURPOSES IN VIEW.-Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire,
panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate
light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks,
and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for
particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the
most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.
Id.
17. Angermeier v. Borough of Sea Girt, 142 A.2d 624, 629 (N.J. 1958). Black's Law Dictionary'defines zoning as "[tihe division of a city by legislative regulation into districts and the
prescription and application in each district of regulations having to do with structural and architectural designs of buildings and of regulations prescribing use to which buildings within designated districts may be put." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1450 (5th ed. 1979).
18. bySTANDARD
STATE
ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 15, § 3.
Published
eCommons,
1991
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Planning, on the other hand, is the "physical development of the community and its environs in relation to its social and economic well-being
for the fulfillment of the rightful common destiny, according to a
'master plan' based on careful and comprehensive surveys . . . of present conditions and the prospects of future growth of the municipality."19 Planning is the general sketch and zoning supplies the details.
Therefore, planning is the foundation upon which zoning regulations
must be built.
The dependence of zoning upon planning is evident. The plan is "a
long-term, general outline of projected development; zoning is but one
of the many tools which may be used to implement the plan."' 20 The
distinction is important because " '[t]he danger is that it [zoning] may
be considered a substitute for . . . planning and that, a zoning plan
having been adopted, enthusiasm and interest may die out. Zoning is
21
not a substitute for a city plan ....
A.

What is a Comprehensive Plan?

While the requirement that zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" is one of the most essential and basic concepts in zoning, it remains one of the least understood and least defined areas of
zoning law.22 Confusion results in part because "the relationship between the zoning ordinance and its parent, the overall . . . plan, has
been explored surprisingly seldom by courts and legislatures. 2 3 The
term comprehensive plan "usually only represents a writer's or judge's
assessment that the zoning is systematic and rational-in other words,
that the zoning itself, considered in its whole and in its parts, evidences
a comprehensive plan."2' 4 One definition of the comprehensive plan provides that:

19. Angermeier, 142 A.2d at 629. " 'Planning' and 'zoning' are closely related, for, in a
general way, planning embraces zoning, but, while not wholly devoid of planning, zoning does not
include the whole of planning. Zoning is, in effect, a part of and product of planning, because.it is
the medium through which the goals of planning may be achieved." 5 ROHAN, supra note 6, §
37.01[1] (footnote omitted).
20. Haar, supra note 9, at 1156.
21. Id. (quoting I HAROLD M. LEWIS, PLANNING THE MODERN CITY 261 (rev. ed. 1949)).
22. 1 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 15, § 12.01, at 12-2.
23. Haar, supra note 9, at 1154 (footnote omitted).
24. 1 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 15, § 12.01, at 12-2. The comprehensive plan is
the standard for zoning action, whether it be the initial adoption of a zoning ordinance, a revision
of the ordinance, an amendment, or zoning action relating to a specific parcel of property by way
of a change in its zoning classification, a special permit, or a variance. In all of these situations,
the body-legislative or administrative-which has the proposed action under consideration, even
if only in an advisory capacity, must take the plan into consideration. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/8

1991]

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN IN OHIO

[The] general plan, or comprehensive plan, with which the amendment
must conform, is many things to many courts. It may be the basic zoning
ordinance itself, or the generalized "policy" of the local legislative or
planning authorities in respect to their city's development-or it may be
nothing more than a general feeling of fairness and rationality. Its identity is not fixed with any precision, and no one can point with confidence
to any particular set of factors, or any document, and say that there is
the general plan to which the zoning enabling act demands fidelity.2"
More simply, the comprehensive plan has been defined as "a scheme or
formula that reasonably relates zoning regulations to the public health,
safety and welfare." 2
Courts have found it particularly difficult to define what constitutes a comprehensive plan. In part, this is because the comprehensive
plan often loses its identity due to the amalgamation of the plan into a
comprehensive zoning ordinance.2 In other words, courts have viewed
the comprehensive plan as part of the comprehensive zoning ordinance.
Zoning, when considered as a self-contained entity rather than as a
means by which to effectuate a broader end, may present considerable
28
problems.
A common problem is the confusion of the comprehensive plan
with a "master plan." The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act requires that zoning ordinances be "in accordance with the comprehensive plan." 2 B On occasion, the comprehensive plan is viewed as synonymous with the "master plan" described in the Standard City Planning
Enabling Act.30 Nevertheless, state courts traditionally have not considered these terms as synonymous. The general purpose of the master

25. Haar, supra note 9, at 1167.
26. 5 ROHAN, supra note 6, § 37.01[l][b], at 37-4.
27. Id.
28. Haar, supra note 9, at 1158. The major problem is that without clearly defined rules
and guidelines which must be followed, the legislative power to zone can be utilized in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion which will more than likely have its most profound effect on the
small individual landowner. Id.
29. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 15, § 3.
30. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT, supra note 11. Section six of the Act provides in pertinent part:
GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES-It shall be the function and duty of the commission to make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of the municipality,
including any areas outside of its boundaries which, in the commission's judgment, bear
relation to the planning of such municipality. Such plan, with the accompanying maps,
plats, charts, and descriptive matter shall show the commission's recommendations for the
development of said territory, including, among other things . ; . a zoning plan for the
control of the height, area, bulk, location, and use of buildings and premises. As the work
of making the whole master plan progresses, the commission may from time to time adopt
and publish a part or parts thereof, any such part to cover one or more major sections or
divisions of the municipality or one or more of the aforesaid or other functional matters to
Published
by eCommons, 1991
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plan as described by one commentator is "to guide and accomplish a
coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the municipality
which would best promote the health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity and general welfare." 31 Zoning ordinances, however,
may be passed without regard for the master plan; consequently, the
master plan has been relegated to a position of being an advisory document with no regulatory effect.3 2 Therefore, the requirement under the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, that local legislative bodies draft
zoning ordinances which are "in accordance with a comprehensive
plan," has not been traditionally read to require a master plan. 33
Another problem with the language of the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act is its failure to specify what constitutes a comprehensive
plan. Traditionally, state courts have not required any physical evidence of a comprehensive plan. For example, in the 1957 New Jersey
Supreme Court decision of Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery,34
the plaintiffs brought an action against two defendant townships contending that recent amendments to zoning ordinances were not "'in
accordance with a comprehensive plan.' "" The Kozesnik court noted
that the history of zoning has demonstrated a lack of continuity between the master plan and the zoning ordinance and stated that "zoning shall not await the development of a master plan." 3 The Kozesnik
court saw no reason why the intent of the legislature should be read to
require that the comprehensive plan be exhibited in some physical form
outside the ordinance itself.3 1 The court stated that the purposes of the
comprehensive plan were furthered through a comprehensive zoning
38
ordinance.

be included in the plan. The commission may from time to time amend, extend or add to
the plan.
Id. § 6.
31. 5 ROHAN, supra note 6, § 37.01[l][c], at 37-10 n.30.
32. Id. at 37-11.
33. Id. at 37-12.
34. 131 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1957). For a more in-depth discussion of Kozesnik, see infra notes 7079 and accompanying text.
35. Kozesnik, 131 A.2d at 6.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. The court stated:
It is thus clear that the "comprehensive plan" of the zoning statute is not identical with the
"master plan" of the Planning Act and need not meet the formal requirements of a master
plan. The Zoning Act nowhere provides that the comprehensive plan shall exist in some
physical form outside the ordinance itself.
Id.
38. The Kozesnik court stated that the purpose of the comprehensive plan was to "prevent a
capricious exercise of the legislative power resulting in haphazard or piecemeal zoning." Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/8
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Early Zoning in Ohio

Before state courts were required to consider the proper form for
the comprehensive plan, they first had to consider the constitutionality
of the comprehensive zoning ordinance and to determine if such ordinance was within the realm of the states' police power. Between the
time of enactment of the first zoning ordinance in New York City in
1916 and the United States Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.39 in 1926, dozens of state supreme courts
were forced to decide the constitutionality of municipal zoning
ordinances. 0
The Ohio Supreme Court first considered the issue in 1925, in
Pritz v. Messer."1 In Pritz, a comprehensive zoning regulation was upheld as a proper exercise of the state's police power.42 Pritz, the plaintiff, owned property adjacent to property belonging to Messer, the defendant. "3 Messer obtained a building permit for the construction of an
eleven story, 400-room apartment house."' The permit was issued to
Messer on March 31, 1924, but was dated April 1 because the books of
the building commissioner's office had been closed for the day. 5 On
April 1, 1924, the Cincinnati City Council enacted a zoning ordinance
which prohibited the construction Messer proposed."6 Pritz petitioned
the court for an injunction to prevent the construction. 7 Messer responded by attacking the constitutionality of the April 1 ordinance,
claiming it violated Article I, Sections 1 and 19, of the Ohio Constitution, and Article XIV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution.4 8
The court phrased the issue as "whether, under the Constitution of
Ohio and of the United States, a city can regulate building development and uses of property within its own boundaries according to zones
or districts." ' The Pritz court held in the affirmative:
An ordinance enacted by a municipality . . . dividing the whole territory
of the municipality into districts according to a comprehensive plan

39. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
40. See I ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 99 n.23.
41. 149 N.E. 30 (Ohio 1925).
42. Id. The Pritz court ruled that "[aln ordinance enacted by a municipality under Article
XVIII, Section 3, of the Ohio Constitution, and under sections 4366-1 to 4366-12, General Code,
dividing the whole territory of the municipality into districts . . .is a valid and constitutional
enactment." Id. (quoting syllabus).
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 32.
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which, in the interest of the public health, public safety, and public
morals, regulates the uses and the location of buildings and other structures and of premises to be used for trade, industry, residence, or other
specific uses, the height, bulk, or location of buildings and other structures thereafter to be erected or altered, including the percentage of lot
occupancy, set back building lines, and the area of yards, courts, and
other spaces, and for such purpose divides the city into zones or districts
of such number, shape, and area as are suited to carry out such purposes,
and provides a method of administration therefor, and prescribes penalties for the violation of such provisions, is a valid and constitutional
enactment.50

The following year, the United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.51 validated the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Pritz.
C.

Ohio After Pritz v. Messer

Like most states, Ohio used the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act as its model to authorize local legislatures to regulate zoning
through the enactment of ordinances. In Ohio there are three different
enabling statutes: one for townships, 52 one for counties, 5" and one for
municipalities.5"
Generally, the powers of a municipality are conferred upon it by
statute. 55 In Ohio, however, the state constitution confers the power to
zone to a municipality. 58 The legal power of Ohio municipal corporations to undertake activities which regulate land use is not dependent

50. Id. at 30 (quoting syllabus).
51. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In 1922, the Village of Euclid, a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio.
adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance regulating and restricting the location of trades, industries, dwellings, etc. Id. at 367. The ordinance confronted by the United States Supreme Court in
Euclid was very similar to the ordinance confronted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Pritz, and
both courts were attempting to determine if this legislative action was a proper exercise of the
state police power. The Euclid court noted that. "[t]he ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted
for the public welfare. The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate
assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation." Id. at 387. The Euclid court then
concluded that:
There is no serious difference of opinion in respect of the validity of laws and regulations
fixing the height of buildings within reasonable limits, the character of materials and methods of construction, and the adjoining area which must be left open, in order to minimize
the danger of fire or collapse, the evils of over-crowding, and the like, and excluding from
residential sections offensive trades, industries and structures likely to create nuisances.
Id. at 388.
52. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 519.02 (Anderson 1987).,
53. Id. § 303.05.
54. Id. § 713.07 (Anderson 1991).
55. Haar, supra note 9, at 1155-56.
56. Henry J. Crawford, Home Use and Land Use Control, 13 W. REs. L. REV. 702, 703
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/8
(1962).
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on the state legislature's enactment of enabling statutes." Instead, the
right of municipalities or municipal corporations to regulate zoning
falls under what is known as the "home-rule" provision of the Ohio
State Constitution.58 First, the Ohio constitution classifies municipal
corporations as either cities or villages. 5 1 Second, it states that
"[m]unicipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws." 60 The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a municipal
corporation may utilize the constitutional home-rule provision to divide
the community into districts and impose regulations upon the use of
land in such districts.6 1
Townships in Ohio do not fall under the home-rule provision; consequently, authorization to zone is statutory. The Ohio General Assembly specifically has incorporated the phrase "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" into Ohio Revised Code section 519.02 which states
that "[flor the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, and
morals, the board of township trustees may in accordance with a comprehensive plan regulate by resolution the location, . . . and for such
purposes may divide all or any part of the unincorporated territory of

57. Id. at 702. The author explains that:
[W]ithin the entire area of "local self-government," municipalities can determine for themselves what is necessary for the public welfare and can adopt the means for carrying out
programs they determine to be necessary, without any statutory authority. Generally
speaking, this power is exercisable by municipalities, as far as concerns the question of
public purpose, to the same extent as it is or may be in other states through the enactment
of statutory authority to undertake a program for the public welfare. In other words, if a
statute (absent the home rule power) could constitutionally authorize municipal land use
controls and urban renewal projects as a part of them, municipalities in Ohio can adopt
and enforce such controls and effect such projects without any statute at all.
The grant of home rule power is self-executing and plenary except only as limited by
parallel constitutional provisions. It supersedes the prior concept that municipal powers
depend upon grants by the General Assembly.
Id. at 703.
Note that although municipalities do not require an enabling statute per se, section 713.07 of
the Ohio Revised Code could be perceived as such. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 713.07 (Anderson 1991).
58. See OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
59. See id. § 1. Section one of the Ohio constitution states: "Municipal corporations are
hereby classified into cities and villages. All such corporations having a population of five thousand or over shall be cities; all others shall be villages. The method of transition from one class to
the other shall be regulated by law." Id.
60. Id. § 3; see also id. § 7. Section seven of the Ohio constitution states: "Any municipality
may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of
section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government." Id. § 7.
61. See Smith v. Juillerat, 119 N.E.2d 611 (Ohio 1954).
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the township into districts or zones ... ."' Since a township's only
power to regulate the use of property by zoning regulations is given to
them by Ohio Revised Code section 519.02, any regulations in zoning
6
resolutions or ordinances which conflict with the statute are void. 3
Counties in Ohio are treated similarly and are required by Ohio
Revised Code section 303.05 to conform to the "in accordance with"
requirement.6 4 Therefore, in Ohio, the power of counties and townships
to enact zoning regulations is limited by the enabling act requirement
that such regulations be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Traditional View

There are currently two views of the comprehensive plan's role in
zoning regulations. The majority view espouses a self-contained doctrine6 5 and reflects the belief that the comprehensive plan is contained
within the zoning ordinance itself. This view assumes that
a comprehensive ordinance, one which blankets the entire area and is
internally consistent, is automatically 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan.' The plan is the ordinance, and the ordinance the plan, and
there is to be no nonsense about a different plan altogether-a master
66
plan-upon which the ordinance must be formulated.

62. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 519.02 (Anderson 1987). This section reads in full:
For the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, and morals, the board of township
trustees may in accordance with a comprehensive plan regulate by resolution the location,
height, bulk, number of stories, and size of buildings and other structures, including tents,
cabins, and trailer coaches, percentages of lot areas which may be occupied, set back building lines, sizes of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of population, the uses of
buildings and other structures including tents, cabins, and trailer coaches, and the uses of
land for trade, industry, residence, recreation, or other purposes in the unincorporated territory of such township, and for such purposes may divide all or any part of the unincorporated territory of the township into districts or zones of such number, shape, and area as
the board determines. All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building or other structure or use throughout any district or zone, but the regulations in one
district or zone may differ from those in other districts or zones.
Id.
63. See Crist v. True, 314 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
64. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 303.05 (Anderson 1987). This section states in pertinent part:
The county rural zoning commission shall submit a plan, including both text and maps,
representing the recommendations of the zoning commission for the carrying out by the
board of county commissioners of the powers, purposes, and provisions set forth in . . .the
Revised Code, including additions to territory in which a county zoning plan is in effect.
Id. (emphasis added).
65. Commentators sometimes refer to this doctrine as the "unitary view" because of the
indivisibility of the comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker,
Note, The Role of the Local Comprehehsive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MicH L. REV. 899,
904 (1976).
66. Haar, supra note 9, at 1167.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/8
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Under the minority view, the comprehensive plan is an independent document separate from the comprehensive zoning ordinance.
This view is gaining acceptance in the state courts and legislatures. Although the "master plan" as described in the Department of Commerce Standard City Planning Enabling Act historically has not been
equated with the comprehensive plan discussed in the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act, proponents of the minority view make it
' 67
mandatory that local governments create a "master plan."
The traditional view, adopted by the majority of courts, is that the
"in accordance" language of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
does not require the development of a local comprehensive plan external to the zoning ordinance as a prerequisite to valid zoning. 6 8 In other
words, the zoning ordinance is self-contained. The leading case expressing this view is Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery.69 In Kozesnik,
the plaintiff contended that a zoning amendment was not in accordance
with a comprehensive plan. 70 In response to the plaintiff's argument
that there can be no comprehensive plan unless it is evidenced in writing outside the zoning ordinance itself, 71 the New Jersey Supreme
Court noted that the Standard City Planning Enabling Act did not require the master plan to be preceded by the adoption or amendment of
a zoning ordinance. 72 The court then recited a brief history of zoning,73

67. 5 ROHAN, supra note 6, at 37-44; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.33-29.70, 29.85-29.90
(1986); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65300-307 (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. IX, §§ 6807(a), 6904
(1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-250 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-.3197 (West 1990);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 225-21 (1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6508, 67-6511 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. §
18-7-2-31 (West 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.187, 100.201, 100.213 (Baldwin 1988);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473.175, 473.854(2), 473.855, 473.858 (West 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23114.03 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 11-2-11, 11-6-2 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.427,
15.446 (Michie 1989).
68. 5 ROHAN, supra note 6, § 37.02[1], at 37-22.
69. 131 A.2d I (N.J. 1957).
70. Id. at 6.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 6-7.
73. The court stated:
No doubt good housekeeping would be served if a zoning ordinance followed and implemented a master plan, but the history of the subject dictated another course. Initially regulations concerning land use were merely prohibitory or restrictive with respect to specific
noxious or dangerous activities. Thereafter a more comprehensive approach developed in
the form of zoning, having as its purpose the creation of districts with regulations as to
construction and use, including regulations as to height, number of stories, sizes of buildings, percentage of lot that may be occupied, sizes of yards, courts, etc. Finally came the
Planning Act, which envisions the development of a plan looking to and guiding future
development with provision for the location of public improvements, control over subdivisions, and the like.
Id. at 7by
(citations
omitted).
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emphasizing that although it might be wise to require the implementation of a comprehensive zoning plan prior to the enactment of zoning
regulations, the historical development of planning and zoning, as they
relate to one another, did not necessitate such treatment .7 The court
continued: "[a]nd doubtless the need for immediate measures led the
[lI]egislature to conclude that zoning shall not await the development of
a master plan."' 75 The Kozesnik court concluded that "the 'comprehensive plan' of the zoning statute is not identical with the 'master plan' of
the Planning Act and [that the comprehensive plan] need not meet the
formal requirements of a master plan.""8 The court also rejected the
notion that the comprehensive plan should "exist in some physical form
outside the ordinance itself."' 77 In spite of its rejection of the requirement of a separate and independent comprehensive plan, the court attempted to define the nature of a comprehensive plan, a task.few courts
have undertaken. The court opined:
There has been little judicial consideration of the precise attributes
of a comprehensive plan. Our own decisions emphasize that its office is to
prevent a capricious exercise of the legislative power resulting in haphazard or piecemeal zoning. Without venturing an exact definition, it may
be said for present purposes that "plan" connotes an integrated product
of a rational process and "comprehensive" requires something beyond a
piecemeal approach, both to be revealed by the ordinance considered in
relation to the physical facts and the purposes authorized by R.S. 40:5532, N.J.S.A. Such being the requirements of a comprehensive plan, no
reason is perceived why we should infer the [1]egislature intended by
necessary implication that the comprehensive plan be portrayed in some
physical form outside the ordinance itself. A plan may readily be revealed in an end-product-here the zoning ordinance-and no more is
78
required by the statute.
The court's dictum points out the problem with this self-containment
approach-any zoning regulation passed by a local legislature in a
state which has adopted this unitarian view is not required to develop a
comprehensive plan in spite of clear statutory language to the contrary.
Consequently, the "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" language
becomes meaningless. The only limitations upon local legislatures are
79
the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted).
79. 5 ROHAN, supra note 6, § 37.02[1], at 37-26. Therefore, if a zoning regulation does not
deprive an individual of "life, liberty, or property" without due process of law, or deny any such
individual equal protection under the law, the regulation will be valid.
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The Modern View

The modern view abandons the unitarian approach typified by
Kozesnik, and puts more bite into the language of the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act 8" by making planning mandatory and by equating the comprehensive plan with the master plan.8 Most states accomplish this transition through legislation. 2 Oregon, however, accomplished the transition judicially in Baker v. City of Milwaukee.8 3
In Baker, the plaintiff was a landowner
in the City of Milwau8
4
kee. The city had adopted a zoning ordinance which designated plaintiff's land and the'surrounding area "A 1 B." 8 This designation would
allow the construction of 39 units per acre8" and, consequently, the
building of apartments and business offices.8 7 A month later, the Planning Commission of the City of Milwaukee adopted a comprehensive
plan for the city which designated plaintiff's land and the surrounding
area as residential. This designiation would allow only 17 units per
acre. 88 The City Council later adopted the comprehensive plan by
resolution. 9
The Planning Commission ignored the comprehensive plan and
granted a variance authorizing the construction of a 95-unit apartment
complex near plaintiff's property.90 Later, a second application was
made for a building permit to construct a 102-unit apartment complex
immediately adjacent to plaintiff's property. 9' The second complex
would result in 26 units per acre. 92 While these 26 units were less than
80. See supra notes 15-16- and accompanying text.
81. 5 ROHAN, supra note 6, § 37.01[1], at 37-8.
82. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6.7-6508 (1989). Section 67-6508 of the Idaho Code states:
It shall be the duty of the planning or planning and zoning commission to conduct a comprehensive planning process designed to prepare, implement, and review and update a comprehensive plan, hereafter referred to as the plan. The plan shall include all land within the
jurisdiction of the governing board. The plan shall consider previous and existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations for each planning
component.

Id.
Idaho Code section 67-6511 provides: "Each governing board shall, by ordinance adopted,
amended, or repealed in accordance with the notice and hearing procedures provided under section
67-6509, Idaho Code, establish within its jurisdiction one or more zones or zoning districts where
appropriate. The zoning districts shall be in accordance with the adopted plan." Id. § 67-6511.
83. 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975).
84. Id. at 773.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 774.
91. Id.
92. byId.
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the 39 units allowed by the zoning ordinance, they exceeded the 17
units allowed by the comprehensive plan.93 The plaintiff sought to compel the City of Milwaukee to conform the zoning ordinance to its comprehensive plan and thereby cancel the variance and suspend the issuance of building permits. 9
The City of Milwaukee contended that although the city had
passed a comprehensive plan, it had no duty to effectuate that plan
through the enactment of conforming zoning ordinances. 95 The Baker
court held that this reasoning "evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between planning and zoning."9 The
Baker court concluded that:
[A] comprehensive plan is the controlling land use planning instrument
for a city. Upon passage of a comprehensive plan a city assumes a responsibility to effectuate that plan and conform prior conflicting zoning
ordinances to it . . . .[F]urther, . . . the zoning decisions of a city must
be in accord with that plan . ...
One of two avenues may be taken to require municipalities, townships, and counties to conform their zoning ordinances to the comprehensive plan-judicial action or legislative action. Although Oregon is
the only state to date to have judicially mandated that zoning ordinances conform to a comprehensive plan, more state courts will be confronted with this issue in the future. 98
C. The Comprehensive Plan in Ohio
Ohio adheres to the majority view and has adopted the position
that the comprehensive plan does not have to be a separate entity found
outside a comprehensive zoning ordinance. By defining a comprehensive
zoning ordinance as "one which effectively provides for that variety and
quantity of land uses deemed necessary.to the orderly development of
the entire territory of the legislative authority enacting it," 99 the Ohio
Supreme Court has ensured that any zoning ordinance meeting the
above criteria will qualify as a comprehensive zoning ordinance, and
consequently, an integrated comprehensive zoning plan.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 773.
95. Id. at 774.
96. Id. at 775.
97. Id. at 779.
98. See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
99. Greenhills Home Owners Corp. v. Village of Greenhills, 215 N.E.2d 403, 404 (Ohio
1966) (quoting syllabus).
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The result of Ohio's position is that local legislatures, without the
benefit of the direction provided by a comprehensive plan, have produced general and vaguely written ordinances rather than a comprehensive zoning scheme which lays out specifics to be followed.' The
Ohio Supreme Court confronted the problem of vague zoning ordinances in 1955 in Cassell v. Lexington Township Board of Zoning Appeals. 01 Cassell, the plaintiff, owned five lots in Lexington Township
and requested the township building inspector to issue to him permits
to build five residential homes on those lots which were valued at
$10,000 to $11,000 each. 0 2 The Lexington Township Board of Zoning
Appeals refused to issue the permits because plaintiff's five lot area was
"one of the finer residential areas adjacent to the [C]ity of
Alliance
and [was] occupied predominantly with homes in the $15,000 to
$40,000 class."' 3 The Cassell court held that
[t]he absence of any comprehensive plan . . . opens the door to an arbitrary and unreasonable administration of the regulation. There being no
yardstick

. . .

by which the zoning commission could possibly be guided,

we can come to no conclusion other than that the commission
arbitrarily and unreasonably in refusing to issue the permits.

. . .
°4

acted

Instead of requiring the formulation of a plan to ensure uniformity and
consistency, the court merely warned that the failure to be consistent
would invalidate the regulations.
D.

Presumption of Validity and the "Fairly Debatable" Standard

Once enacted, zoning regulations in the United States are nearly
invulnerable to constitutional challenge. First, zoning regulations, as
with all legislative enactments, are presumptively constitutional, 10 5 and
the burden falls on the party attacking the ordinance to prove otherwise. 10 6 This presumption not only applies to the original ordinance established by the local legislative body, but also to all amendments and
variances enacted or granted in relation to the ordinance. Second, Ohio
courts apply a standard of review to challenges of zoning ordinances or

100. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-6508 (1989) (setting out all the factors which must be
addressed in the comprehensive plan); see also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302 (West 1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 163.3177 (West 1990).
101. 127 N.E.2d 11 (Ohio 1955).
102. Id. at 12.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 14.
105. See Brown v. City of Cleveland, 420 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio 1981); see also Garcia v.
Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (Ohio 1980); State v. Renalist, Inc., 383 N.E.2d 892
(Ohio 1978);
Mobil Oil Corp.
v. City of Rocky River, 309 N.E.2d 900 (Ohio 1974).
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amendments that further enhances the presumptive validity of any ordinance. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that "[i]n order to invalidate [a] zoning regulation on constitutional grounds, [the] parties attacking it must demonstrate, beyond fair debate, that [the] zoning
classification denies them [the] economically viable use of their land
without substantially advancing [a] legitimate interest in [the] health,
safety, or welfare of [the] community."1 07
The "fairly debatable" standard is very difficult to overcome for
someone who is challenging a zoning ordinance or amendment. Almost
any ordinance or amendment arguably can be enacted to further the
health, safety, morals or welfare of a community.10 8 The Ohio Supreme
Court has not precisely defined the term "fairly debatable," and the
Ohio appellate courts are in disagreement about the application of the
standard. The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County appears to have
adopted a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard from the following
statement:
The validity of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable if reasonable
minds may differ. A mere difference of opinion is not sufficient to make
the issue of validity of a zoning ordinance fairly debatable because it is
relatively easy for a property owner and a municipality to obtain the
services of expert witnesses who will have differing opinions as to the
validity of a zoning ordinance. The fairly debatable rule must concern
itself not with mere words or expressions of opinion, but basic physical
facts pertinent to the issue of the validity of the zoning ordinance.

107. Ketchel v. Bainbridge Township, 557 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ohio 1990) (emphasis added);
see Karches v. Cincinnati, 526 N.E.2d 1350 (Ohio 1988); Mayfield-Dorsh, Inc. v. City of South
Euclid, 429 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1981); Brown v. City of Cleveland, 420 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio 1981);
Superior Uptown v. Cleveland, 313 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio 1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Rocky
River, 309 N.E.2d 900 (Ohio 1974); Willott v. Beachwood, 197 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1964); State ex
rel. Beerman v. City of Kettering, 201 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); State ex rel. Prentke v.
Village of Brook Park, 153 N.E.2d 677 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958); Cleveland Trust v. Village of
Brooklyn, 110 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
108. The fairly debatable standard, as applied to zoning resolutions, was first set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in the 1926 decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court stated in Euclid that "[i]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."
Id. at 388 (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924)). In Radice, the court held that:
Where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of facts, courts
must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them contrary to that reached by
the legislature; and if the question of what the facts establish be a fairly debatable one, it is
not permissible for the judge to set up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the
lawmaker.
Radice, 264 U.S. at 294.
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Where it appears from all the facts that room exists for a difference
of opinion concerning the reasonableness of a zoning classification, the
legislative judgment is conclusive.1" 9

Other Ohio appellate courts have imposed different burdens of proof.
One court ruled that in order for a zoning ordinance to be declared
unconstitutional, it must be demonstrated to be "clearly erroneous";1 10
another held that the party attacking the ordinance must "clearly establish" the unreasonable and arbitrary nature of the ordinance;"' yet
another held that it must "clearly appear" that the ordinance has no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.' Other Ohio appellate courts have applied the strict standard of
"clear and convincing evidence""' 3 and "beyond a reasonable
doubt."'1 " It is evident that Ohio appellate courts disagree as to the
meaning and application of the "fairly debatable" standard.
Due to the lack of uniformity surrounding the "fairly debatable"
standard, a similar situation may be given different treatment depending upon which court hears the case. The Ohio Supreme Court should
end this discrepancy by supplying a uniform standard in Ohio.

109. Central Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E.2d 258, 272 (Ohio Ct. App.
1979). The court held that "[wlithin reasonably debatable areas of judgment and policies, courts
will not attempt to decide what ought to be done or not done by local zoning authorities. Only
where illegality is clearly demonstrated or where the ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory is judicial interference warranted." Id.
110. Id.; see Curtiss v. City of Cleveland, 163 N.E.2d 682 (Ohio 1959). In Curtiss, the
court ruled that:
Whether such legislation bears such real and substantial relation and whether it is reasonable or arbitrary are questions committed in the first instance to the judgment and determination of the legislative body, and the decisions of such legislative body on those questions
will not be disturbed unless they appear to be clearly erroneous.
Curtiss, 163 N.E.2d at 685.
111. Central Motors, 409 N.E.2d at 272; see Alsenas V. Brecksville, 281 N.E.2d 21 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1972). The Alsenas court held that:
To prevail . . . the appellee had to clearly establish . . . that the legislative body could not
have reasonably believed the necessity of regulation in the public interest outweighed, qualitatively, the impact of the regulations imposed, i.e., that the ordinance clearly does not
bear a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare
and is, in turn, unreasonable or arbitrary.
Alsenas, 281 N.E.2d at 24.
112. Central Motors, 409 N.E.2d at 272; see State ex rel. Cook v. Turgeon, 77 N.E.2d 283
(Ohio Ct. App. 1947). This court believed that "it may be stated as a well-settled general rule
that before the court will declare a zoning ordinance invalid, it must clearly appear that it has no
substantial relation to the public health, safety or morals, or to the general welfare." Cook, 77
N.E.2d at 287 (emphasis omitted).
113. Central Motors, 409 N.E.2d at 272; see Stocker v. Wood, 246 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1969). The Stocker court held that in order "[t]o overcome the presumption of regularity
and validity with which the action of [the Board of County Commissioners] is clothed, it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to produce clear and convincing proof of its invalidity." Stocker, 246
N.E.2d at
see also Criterion
Published
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1991 Service, Inc. v. City of East Cleveland, 88 N.E.2d 300 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1949).
114. See Hilton v. Toledo, 405 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1980).
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Limitations on Zoning Boards

The fairly debatable standard would pose less of a problem if the
various zoning boards were required to pass zoning ordinances and
amendments in accordance with a comprehensive plan. Requiring a
comprehensive zoning plan to be separate and apart from zoning ordinances would serve as an additional limitation upon the power of the
zoning boards. Currently, a zoning board in Ohio may enact a comprehensive zoning ordinance or zoning amendment, either through authorization from the state via enabling legislation or through the home rule
provision of the Ohio Constitution, and be assured of its validity so long
as the ordinance or amendment is not violative of the due process or
equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. It surely
could not have been the intention of the United States Department of
Commerce, in drafting the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, to
render the effect of the statute negligible in limiting zoning regulation.
In Ohio, as well as in a majority of states, the comprehensive plan has
been rendered a worthless document having no binding effect on zoning
commissions. The comprehensive plan should become synonymous with
the master plan. This is the only interpretation that would fully effectuate the purposes of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and the
Standard City Planning Enabling Act. Ohio should follow the lead of
Oregon which by judicial fiat115 required that zoning be furthered only
in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
F.

Municipal Home-Rule Provision

Perhaps the most compelling reason for Ohio to reject the traditional unitarian view is to counteract the power granted to municipalities by the Ohio Constitution. The rejection of the unitarian position
would compel municipalities in Ohio to establish comprehensive zoning
plans.
The position of the Ohio courts today with regard to municipalities
was stated succinctly in Central Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper
Pike."'6 In Central Motors, the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County
flatly acknowledged that "Ohio law does not require a municipality to
adopt a comprehensive zoning plan as a condition precedent to the enactment of zoning legislation. 1 17 Further, the court acknowledged that
"although a comprehensive plan is usually separate and distinct from a
zoning ordinance, it is possible for an ordinance in and of itself to be a

115. See supra notes 83-97 and. accompanying text.
116. 409 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
117. Id. at 280.
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comprehensive plan, absent a specific requirement in the enabling legislation.""1 8 Even though the existence of a comprehensive plan was said
to make a zoning ordinance less vulnerable to constitutional attack,
"the general rule that the challenge to constitutionality must establish
that the ordinance is arbitrary, confiscatory, unreasonable, and not
based on the public health, safety, morals and general welfare ' 1 1 9
makes the plaintiff's burden great. Therefore, not only is a municipality
not required to adopt a comprehensive zoning plan, but its zoning ordinances are not required to be comprehensive in nature. The result is
that in municipalities where the need for comprehensive zoning is the
greatest because of population density and competition for commercial
land, comprehensive planning and zoning is least likely to occur.
Therefore, the Ohio General Assembly, in furtherance of zoning
consistency should create legislation requiring municipalities to enact
zoning regulations consistent with a separate, independent comprehensive plan. With the urban areas of the state steadily increasing in population, the legislature or judiciary must act and mandate that zoning be
done'in accordance with a comprehensive plan. The home-rule provision gives municipalities too much freedom to regulate zoning. Additional limitations must be placed upon them in order to further consistency within the municipalities. The Ohio legislature must first take
this step. If the legislature refuses to enact this kind of' legislation, then
it is up to the courts to mandate the creation of a comprehensive plan.
In this endeavor, courts would be wise to follow the lead of the Oregon
Supreme Court in their decision of Baker v. City of Milwaukee. 2 '
G.

PracticalApplication in Ohio

The Ohio Supreme Court most recently confronted the issue of a
comprehensive plan as a prerequisite to valid zoning ordinances in Columbia Oldsmobile, Inc. v. City of Montgomery. 2 ' In 1975, Columbia
Oldsmobile, Inc. ("Columbia") purchased an 11.5 acre parcel of land
within the City of Montgomery. 2 ' At the time of the purchase, the
parcel was zoned as "A"-the residential classification. 2 3 In 1976, a
new zoning ordinance was enacted which again zoned the parcel as

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975).
121. 564 N.E.2d 455 (Ohio 1990), reh'g denied, 566 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio 1991).'
122. Id. at 456.
123. Id. Prior to its purchase by Columbia in 1975, the parcel had been used as a drive-in.
Although the parcel was zoned residential, this use as a drive-in was valid as a prior non-conforming use. Id.
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"A" residential. 124 For three years, from 1982-1985, Columbia leased
the parcel to the City of Montgomery to facilitate the storage of highway equipment. During this time, Columbia purchased an adjacent
5
5.1-acre parcel of land which bordered Montgomery road" and was
12 6
zoned "E" retail business.
In 1985, Columbia submitted an application to the City of Montgomery requesting that both parcels be rezoned to the classification
"PD Planned Development."' 2 7 The city denied the application, and
Columbia commenced a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether the "A" residential zoning classification was unconstitutional
as applied to the 11.5-acre parcel. 2 8
The trial court determined that the sole issue was the constitutionality of the "A" residential classification as applied to the 11.5-acre
parcel.' 9 The court concluded that the zoning ordinance was constitutional as applied to Columbia's property. 30 One of the factors which
that the zoning ordiinfluenced the trial court's decision was its finding
3
nance was based upon a comprehensive plan.' '
On appeal, Columbia alleged that the trial court had committed
error in finding that the zoning classification of the parcel was based
upon a comprehensive plan.' 32 The court of appeals agreed. The court
of appeals, borrowing the language found in Greenhills Home Owners
Corp. v. Village of Greenhills,133 defined a comprehensive zoning ordinance as "one which effectively provides for that variety and quantity
of land uses deemed necessary to the orderly development of the entire
territory of the legislative authority enacting it."' 134 Using this definition as the standard, the court first noted that there was evidence in the
record to indicate that the city had adopted a document in 1976 setting
forth certain city goals and policies rather than a formally adopted
comprehensive community plan. Even so, the court held that this document "[did] not rise to the level of a comprehensive zoning ordinance"

124. Id.
125. Contained within the 1976 ordinance, the City of Montgomery created a "commercial
corridor" which bordered Montgomery Road on both sides providing for the establishment of
retail businesses. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Columbia Oldsmobile, Inc. v. City of Montgomery, No. C-870741, 1989 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1670, at *3 (Hamilton County May 10, 1989).
130. Id.
131. Id. at *8.
132. Id.
133. 215 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio 1966).
134. Columbia Oldsmobile, No. C-870741, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 1670, at *10 (citing
Greenhills., 215 N.E.2d at 404 (citing syllabus)).
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and "[tihe trial court erred in finding the existence of a comprehensive
community plan."' 5 It is significant to note, however, that the court of
appeals adhered to the majority position by equating a comprehensive
zoning ordinance with a comprehensive plan and requiring a municipality to establish a comprehensive plan to which zoning regulations must
conform.
The Ohio Supreme Court seized this opportunity to solidify the
majority position in Ohio by not requiring municipalities to create a
comprehensive plan. The court held that:
[Ohio Revised Code section] 303.02, regulating rural land use in counties, and [Ohio Revised Code section] 519.02, regulating land use in
townships, require that zoning regulations promulgated by counties and
townships be in accordance with a comprehensive plan. However, there is
no statutory requirement that cities such as Montgomery enact a comprehensive community plan pursuant to its power to zone under [Ohio
Revised Code sections] 713.06 et seq. The court of appeals erred by implicitly requiring municipalities to enact a comprehensive community
36
plan. L
Since Ohio equates a comprehensive zoning ordinance with the comprehensive plan mentioned in Ohio Revised Code sections 303.02 and
519.02, there is no requirement, as found by the Ohio Supreme Court,
that municipalities even maintain a comprehensive zoning ordinance.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The comprehensive plan in Ohio is an enigma for it exists only in
principle and not in practice. Although the enabling legislation in Ohio
requires townships and counties to zone in accordance with a comprehensive plan, the requirement is symbolic at best. Zoning regulations
which are not required to conform to a sound, long-range comprehensive plan are neither truly comprehensive in nature, nor do they provide
necessary limitations upon local governmental bodies or adequate protection from possible arbitrary and discriminatory action to landowners. Ohio needs to better define this area of the law and thus end the
uncertainty surrounding zoning regulation.
Robert F. Benintendi

135. Id.at *10-11.
136. Columbia Oldsmobile, Inc. v. City of Montgomery, 564 N.E.2d 455, 460 (Ohio 1990),
reh'g denied, 566 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio 1991).
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